Attainable Knowledge

The article investigates an evidence-based semantics for epistemic logics in which pieces of evidence are interpreted as equivalence relations on the epistemic worlds. It is shown that the properties of knowledge obtained from potentially infinitely many pieces of evidence are described by modal logic S5. At the same time, the properties of knowledge obtained from only a finite number of pieces of evidence are described by modal logic S4. The main technical result is a sound and complete bi-modal logical system that describes properties of these two modalities and their interplay

Marketing Impact on Diffusion in Social Networks

The paper proposes a way to add marketing into the standard threshold model of social networks. Within this framework, the paper studies logical properties of the influence relation between sets of agents in social networks. Two different forms of this relation are considered: one for promotional marketing and the other for preventive marketing. In each case a sound and complete logical system describing properties of the influence relation is proposed. Both systems could be viewed as extensions of Armstrong's axioms of functional dependency from the database theory

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

The Budget-Constrained Functional Dependency

Armstrong's axioms of functional dependency form a well-known logical system that captures properties of functional dependencies between sets of database attributes. This article assumes that there are costs associated with attributes and proposes an extension of Armstrong's system for reasoning about budget-constrained functional dependencies in such a setting. The main technical result of this article is the completeness theorem for the proposed logical system. Although the proposed axioms are obtained by just adding cost subscript to the original Armstrong's axioms, the proof of the completeness for the proposed system is significantly more complicated than that for the Armstrong's system